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Transylvania's inter-ethnic and social relations were determined by several interwoven processes. 
Generally, it was an era of strengthening national movements and the transition to a capitalist 
economy had intensive effects in Transylvania. There was a peculiar fusion of ethnicity, society and 
politics unlike in earlier times.1 Relations of Transylvania's nationalities (Romanian, Hungarian, 
Saxons) were historically characterized by 1) nationalities living side by side and nation-building and 
2) by the nation building elites, which were regional groups with partly different strategies than their 
nations states. There are three – partly overlapping – problems to focus on. Firstly, the question of 
Transylvania: if it is part of Romania or Hungary or is it independent. Secondly, the administrative 
and ecopolitical status within a given nation-state. Thirdly, the relationship between the ethnic groups 
and the handling of ethnic problems.  
This paper focuses on nation-building and nation builders' and regional perspectives. Nation-
building approaches the question from the top, its aim is the construction and reinforcement of the 
idea of the nation-state, while regionalism relies on the experiences and aspirations (i.e. national 
culture, economic strength) of grass-root political movements within a given region.2 In Transylvania, 
nation-building and regionalism are inseparable even if there are differences in their  methods and 
approach as there could be various, even contradictory identities if we take a deeper look at the nation 
which seems united from the top.3  
Looking at the local/regional political and social relations is one way of overcoming the more 
traditional Hungarian discrimination and decline oriented historiography. Community-building 
historiography approach focuses on societal organization (communal institutions, development and 
operation of networks) and on the phylogeny of ethnic groups (i.e.: how the elite is produced).4 
Since the turn of the century, the arguments related to nation, state and the Transylvanian 
region focused on property rights, voting right reforms and on the unanswered question of nation-
building. Actors of the Transylvanian nation-builders with their program tried to develop end 
refurbish the relations between regional society and land management. In the Székely Land there are 
examples of institutions (Székely Társaság, Székely Táraságok Szövetsége) which tried to propose 
and advocate for regional and nation-wide policies, examples for local cultural movements and 
periodicals which pushed for autonomous policies (Erdélyi Szemle, A Szemle, Új Erdély, Kalotaszeg).  
 
 
 
                                                 
1 GYÁNI, Gábor: A nemzeti történetírás válaszúton. Limes, 2012. Year 25., No. 4, Vol. I. Pg. 5. 
      2 KÁNTOR, Zoltán: Kisebbségi nemzetépítés. REGIO, 2000. Year 11., No. 3, Pg. 220-225.; ÉGER György–LANGER, 
Josef: Határ, régió, etnikumok Közép-Európában. Osiris–MTA Kisebbségkutató Intézet, Budapest 2001, Pg. 19-23. 
3 EGRY, Gábor: Etnicitás, identitás, politika. Magyar kisebbségek nacionalizmus és regionalizmus között Romániában 
és Csehszlovákiában 1918-1944. 2015. Budapest, Napvilág Kiadó [Furthermore: EGRY, Etnicitás, 2015] 
4 BÍRÓ, Sándor: Többségben és kisebbségben. Foreword by Nándor Bárdi. Pro-Print, Csíkszereda, 2002, Pg. 9. 
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Examples for land policies and settlement movements (István Bethlen, Ignác Darányi) and the 
foundation of the Erdélyi Szövetség in 1913 by István Tisza Even if the various - and at times 
competing - Hungarian political groups offered different answers (for example in the question of 
suffrage), all were organized around the identity politics of the thousand year old state and the 
Hungarian nation-state's history and had the same goal: to protect the Hungarian dominance in 
Transylvania. They started a social movement, wanted to participate locally and regionally, they 
repackaged the Transylvania-question into a self-defense strategy, and attack the ruling party's 
administration and its representatives from the outside and from the bottom. The various proposals 
contained mutually reinforcing economic, social policies (developments of banking, industry and 
commerce, land politics and prevention of migration) and purely national policies. In the latter 
policies regarding non-Hungarian minorities need to be noted. Such was the proposal of the culture 
zone, which hit the Hungarian minority in Romania between the two World Wars like a boomerang, 
the emigration of Romanians or the goal of monolingualism. They were for strong governmental 
intervention even if it meant the state lessening the financial burden of the Hungarian urban 
population and leaving out the Romanian and German population from such programs. There were 
no shortage in the “diverse” tools used for influencing local social and political relations, which were 
only strengthened by other West-European examples (forcing Germans out of Alsace-Lorraine, 
Germanisation of the Polish peasantry, etc.). 
During the debate the Transylvanian Hungarian leaders did not give up any power for the 
benefit of the nationalities. At the same time, they were highly critical of the centralized Hungarian 
Kingdom, which – they said – weakened Hungarian's cultural and economical development in 
Transylvania. They were considering strategies of lessening the conflict between Hungarians-
Hungarians, Transylvania-Budapest, the governing party and the opposition, which would maintain 
the system of the Austrian-Hungarian compromise and would also maintain Hungarian supremacy in 
Transylvania. They had different alternatives. They wanted a certain level of independence for their 
region, bigger autonomy from Budapest without questioning the doctrine of the unified nation.5 One 
of the main figures was István Bethlen, who were against any kind of democratization of Hungarian 
nationality politics before 1918. His organizational skills and influence were proven – among other 
things  - by convincing independence favoring politicians, (Apáthy, Kenéz, Zágoni, Paál, etc.) who 
were for universal suffrage, to stand by him, while – even if within certain limits – could cooperate 
with Tisza as well. The progressive political elements (social questions, suffarge, etc.) did not 
disappear completely, but their positions lessened probably due to the political radicalism of the 
World War and to the Romanian military attack in 1916. 
                                                 
5 K. LENGYEL, Zsolt: A kompromisszum keresése. Tanulmányok a 20. századi transzilvanizmus korai történetéhez. 
Csíkszereda, Pro-Print Könyvkiadó, 2007. 5-6. 
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The story of the collapse of 1918 and the Transylvanian empire change cannot be told without 
taking into consideration 1916. The 1916 Romanian-Hungarian War was a turning point not only 
because it had long term effects on the Hungarian political class and on everyday life, but because it 
turned Transylvania into a battle-ground, and remained so until the end of the War. Governmental 
function could not, or only in a very limited capacity, operate in the counties along the Romanian 
border, economy collapsed and Romanian-Hungarian political relations reached a breaking point, 
further radicalizing programs against nationalities in the name of protecting Hungarian supremacy. 
 World War I has changed everything, because the shrinking of the so called historical nation 
questioned almost all the elements of the national identity discourse: from its historical calling 
through the nation's ability to establish a state to the Hungarian people's ability to welcome others 
(the latter was mostly characterized by Hungary). There was a shift in the institutional and cultural 
background in identity politics, which led to its change.6  
Following the empire change, an adjustment was necessary and besides the need for  
continuity (defending the economical, cultural and political positions) new elements became more 
important: the need for adaptation to face the challenge of termination within a new Romanian 
cultural majority (and also the need to express otherness); self-organizing of a minority society 
(institutionalization); political-cultural integration, which contained hundreds of thousands of 
Hungarian Jews and working class people. 
 Continuity became an integral part of Hungarian Romanian political thought. One of the 
demands of the Transylvanian Hungarians was to be recognized as a nation-building nationality 
(equality). The minority's elite's reasoning was that with the ratification of the Treaty of Trianon the 
Romanian Hungarian people - so those who speak Hungarian, are of Hungarian nationality, have an 
advanced Hungarian identity and part of the 1000 year old Hungarian political heritage– were forced 
out of Hungary as a result of political reasons. The collapse after the war terminated the earlier 
conditions in several areas of life. If we are dealing with the question on an individual level, the 
separation of families (tens of thousands of repatriates to Hungary) crimes against personal property 
(requisition of fixed and movable assets, etc.). The Romanian land reform was especially unfavorable 
towards the aristocracy, the common lands, assets of foundations, and towards civil organizations and 
the churches. There were similarly radical and for the Hungarians negative changes with the 
expansion of the Romanian state educational system. 
  
 
 
                                                 
6 EGRY, Etnicitás, 2015. 109. 
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The questions of self-organization and otherness are manifold. Hungarians had to adapt to 
their new position as a minority and needed to to form answers to the questions of modernity, answers 
which are legitimate within their own community and within the new nation-state. The new situation 
naturally brought the threat of vulnerability and of the increased importance and demand for solidarity 
and democratic values. Unlike in the radicalizing Hungary, in the Transylvanian Hungarian 
community there was no need for scapegoats after 1919. In the name of a unified nation, the need for 
the integration of the Jewish and of the working class was appraised (rejecting the ideas of numerus 
clausus and antisemitism). The minority position meant an increased focus on diversity which could 
be described within the Bucharest – Budapest – international dimensions (United Nations, 
cooperation with other national minorities). 
 One of the biggest debate within the Hungarian-Hungarian relations was when governmental 
circles (with the leadership of István Bethlen) appointed the Transylvanian politicians they felt they 
could rely on. This conflict is remembered as the passivist- activist conflict in the Hungarian minority 
historiography, with the former not willing to politically organize for a long time (demonstration 
against the annexation of Transylvania to Romania). Regionalism is another landmark which affected 
minority-majority relations. Romania's decentralization was one of the central elements of the 
Hungarian political agenda in which the historical Transylvania and its inner region, Székely Land is 
an autonomous administrative area. There were two concepts. One is Romania's federalization which 
keeps in mind Transylvania's unique ethnic relations and which is similar to the Jászi-type system of 
cantons. The other is national institutional building, the ethnic autonomy plan, which prefers the 
development of a community with its own ethno-culture. This concept of minority, which recognizes 
collective rights, was similar to the goals of the regional Romanian elite before 1918 (e.g. providing 
autonomous religious education, widespread guarantee of language rights in education, 
administration and the courts, etc.). The struggle for decentralization was interlaced with the 
democratic question of the Romanian political system. Since the turn of the century and into the 
1920s, universal suffrage was part of the political agenda – demanded by both the supporters of 
independence and by the progressives. Even though the new Romanian state provided universal 
suffrage, but put many obstacles in the way (electoral corruption, withdrawal of citizenship, etc.). At 
that point progressives and conservatives demanded together the proper democratic parliamentary 
representation of the Hungarian ethnic minority and the provision of the rights for free political 
organizing and advocacy (the right to strike, etc.).  
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 In the Hungarian minority historiography the first significant generation is called seceded 
Hungarians. Károly Kós, Árpád Paál, György Bernády, György Bethlen, Gábor Pál, Elemér, 
Jakabffy, Artúr Balogh and their contemporaries partly belonged to the political and intellectual elite 
of regionalism who remained home before 1918 and partly to the Erdélyi Szövetség which provided 
regionalism's framework. The first generation was socialized in Hungary before World War I, and 
became a minority from a majority under the new circumstances.7 „History creates situations of 
destiny and humans create various forms of behavior on the different levels of consciousness in these 
situations.”8 These nation-building activists with different world-views created the first Hungarian 
organization together, the Magyar Szövetség (Hungarian Association) in January 1921 and later on 
their parties along the fractures of the Hungarian political community. First the Erdélyi Néppárt 
(Transylvanian People's Party) then its counterpart, the Magyar Nemzeti Párt (Hungarian National 
Party). Magyar Szövetség was for national unity, Erdélyi Néppárt was for progression and Romania's 
federalization, while Magyar Nemzeti Párt was fighting for ethnic autonomy. The two groups had 
their public forums, Keleti Újság/Napkelet with its revolutionary past and the more conservative 
Ellenzék/Pásztrortűz daily papers. These newspapers, even sometimes as each other's competition, 
represented otherness and continuity as well as self-organization and integration.  
Member of parliament Tibor Zima stated the following question in July, 1922: „this 
generation will not be able to emancipate itself from the conditioning it has thanks to the earth-
shattering events. This conditioning has determined its views about its class status, choice of political 
parties, thinking and its whole intellect. Will this generation be able to, for example, stand behind a 
clear democratic platform, which will be necessary due to Hungarians minority position in 
Romania?”.9 Árpád Antal's answer to the question was that a system of state must be found which is 
suitable for Transylvanian (regional) and other ethnic groups living there, which basically means a 
federalist Romania. Paál stated the idea – which was the same as the Néppárt's program – the 
following way: „we, Transylvania ethnic minorities realize that regionalism ensures the best way to 
create and maintain the most organic relationship between our motherland and the state. The 
creation of a regionalist constitution in Transylvania and in other annexed territories is the key to 
solve the problem of this ethnically diverse region, the most diverse one in the country. This is not 
separation but the integration of the peculiar details into a country-wide system.”10 
 
 
                                                 
7 BÁRDI, Nándor: Otthon és haza. Tanulmányok a romániai magyar kisebbség történetéről. 2013. Pro-Print, Csíkszereda, 
Magyar Kisebbség Könyvtára. 481. 
8 BENKŐ, Samu: A helyzettudat változásai. 1977. Bucharest, Kriterion Könyvkiadó, 8. [Furthermore: BENKŐ, 1977] 
9 Congress of the Erdélyi Néppárt and the Hungarian representatives. Keleti Újság, 1922. 5. year. 154. 13 July. Pg. 2. 
10 Árpád Paál: The historical calling of Magyar Néppárt. Keleti Újság, 1922. 5. year, 268. 26 November. 1-2. 
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 Even though the different knowledge, aptitude, and moral norms individually affect the 
direction of career paths', the common historical past determines the possibilities for action. It is not 
about predestination or resignation but that this is the context one had to deal with and about the goal 
of an intellectual to change the “objective situation”. It is this willingness to initiate change which 
creates new concepts, developments in science, in art and changes political behavior. Societies of 
East-Central Europe were rather characterized by rigidity than dynamic movements. Above all these 
changes came about due of conflicts among the great-powers, but they forced changes in status 
awareness on individual and communal levels. Besides the fear from destruction there were also 
examples one could follow which gave the chance for the increasing and differentiating intellectuals 
of Transylvania and to members of the elite. According to Samu Benkő, this intellectual 
consciousness also means that it measures itself against universal standards. It measures individual 
goals, communal commitment, achievements and successes against the ideas of Europe's intellectual 
life.11 
 In the time of state-power change, while in Hungary everything was viewed negatively which 
had anything to do with wilsonism, human rights, democracy, collective political rights, assimilation, 
development, etc., In Transylvania these, even if they had slightly different meanings, were important 
values within the political discourse. The collapse of Hungary changed the status of the Hungarians 
which lead to the re-evaluation of such political and social notions as state-power, democracy, 
autonomy, independence, culture, traditions, solidarity, etc. The Hungarian leadership faced new 
alternatives, which was also looking for emancipation from weighing pressure and centralization. 
Even if intellectual life was in discomfort and creative work had to deal with many obstacles, the 
moral norms of the minority position required the harmonization of individual and common interests, 
the recognition and identification of the people's interest, and as a result of such recognition, it also 
required growing solidarity.  
 
                                                 
11 BENKŐ, 1977. 8-9 
